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1 2 3 4 5	L. Paul Mankin, IV (SBN 264038) LAW OFFICES OF L. PAUL MANKIN 8730 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 310 Beverly Hills, California 90211 Tel: (310) 776-6336 Fax: (323) 207-3885 pmankin@paulmankin.com Attorney for Plaintiffs	MOV-6 PM 3: 14  RX U.S. DISTRICT COURT LOS ANGELES  EXAMPLES
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8	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRI	CT OF CALIFORNIA CV13-8234 TMO (ASX)  Case No.:
10	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	Con No. 13-8234 MM (ASX)
11	YVETTE CASTILLO and MICHAEL CASTILLO, individually, and on behalf of other members of	
12	the general public similarly situated,	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
13	Plaintiffs,	(1) Violation of Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Cal.
14	VS.	Civil Code §§ 2981 et seq.); (2) Violation of Unfair Competition  Law (Col. Business & Professions
15		Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.); (3) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt
16   17	CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware	(3) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Cal. Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq.);
18	Limited Liability Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10,	(4) Conversion; and (5) Declaratory Relief.
19	DOES I dirough 10,	(5) 150014141013 1101101.
20	Defendants.	Jury Trial Demanded
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	CLASS ACT	TION COMPLAINT
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YVETTE CASTILLO and MICHAEL CASTILLO (herein "Plaintiffs"), individually and on behalf of all other members of the public similarly situated, based upon facts which either have evidentiary support, or are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, alleges as follows:

#### NATURE OF THE ACTION

- Plaintiffs bring this class action under California's Unfair 1. Competition Law, Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance act, Cal. Civil Code §§2981, et seq., and other applicable laws, to challenger the unlawful, unfair, and deceptive practices of CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC's ("Defendant" or "Cavalry") following repossession of motor vehicles from California consumers. In particular, Cavalry fails to provide borrowers under conditional sales contracts with statutorily mandated notice of their legal rights and obligations after repossession of their vehicles; wrongfully deprives consumers of their right to reinstate or redeem their conditional sales contracts after repossession; negligently and/or fraudulently misrepresents the rights and obligations of the parties following repossession; collects, or seeks to collect, deficiencies from borrowers following repossession for which borrowers are not liable as a matter of law; seeks and obtains deficiency judgments knowing that such judgments are unlawful; unlawfully and falsely reporting borrowers' deficiency balances to credit reporting agencies as past due debts when collection of said amounts is in fact unlawful; and demanding repossession expenses which exceeds the amount allowable under California law...
- 2. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons, seeks statutory damages, actual damages as applicable, injunctive and equitable relief, attorneys' fees and costs and all other available relief for Plaintiffs and all other members of the class described below.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), the "Class Action Fairness Act of 2005," because this case is filed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the aggregate amount in controversy for the entire class exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and all members of the class are citizens of California and reside outside of Delaware and Arizona.
- 4. Venue is proper in this district and division under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this judicial district. Defendant transacts business across the United States and in this judicial district.

#### THE PARTIES

- 5. Plaintiff Yvette Castillo is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a resident of Ventura County, California. At the time of repossession of Plaintiffs' vehicle and commencement of this action, Plaintiff Yvette Castillo resided in the City of Camarillo, California. Plaintiff Yvette Castillo is a "consumer" as defined by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3), and is a "debtor" as defined by the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788.2(h).
- 6. Plaintiff Michael Castillo is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a resident of Ventura County, California. At the time of repossession of Plaintiffs' vehicle and commencement of this action, Plaintiff Michael Castillo resided in the City of Camarillo, California. Plaintiff Michael Castillo is a "consumer" as defined by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3), and is a "debtor" as defined by the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788.2(h).
- 7. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC is a Delaware limited liability corporation with its principal office at 4050 E. Cotton Center Blvd., Phoenix, Arizona 85040. Cavalry is financial institution engaged, in part, in the business of

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"holding" automobile loans, and is doing business in California.

- 8. At all relevant times herein, Calvary was a company engaged, by use of the mails and telephone, in the business of collecting a debt from Plaintiffs which qualifies as a "debt," as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), and a "consumer debt," as defined by California Civil Code § 1788.2(f). Defendant regularly attempts to collect debts alleged to be due by another, and therefore is a "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), and RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c).
- 9. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names or capacities of the Defendants sued herein under the fictitious names DOES 1 through 10, but prays for leave to amend and serve such fictitiously named defendants once their names and capacities become known.
- 10. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that DOES 1 through 10 are the partners, agents, owners, shareholders, managers or employees of Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC.
- 11. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each and all of the acts and omissions alleged herein was performed by, or is attributable to, Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, and/or DOES 1 through 10, each acting as the agent for the other, with legal authority to act on the other's behalf. The acts of any and all Defendants were in accordance with, and represent, the official policy of Defendant Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC.
- 12. At all relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, ratified each and every act or omission complained of herein. At all relevant times, Defendants, aided and abetted the acts and omissions of each and all the other Defendants in proximately causing the damages herein alleged.
- 13. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each of said Defendants are in some manner intentionally, negligently, or otherwise responsible for the acts, omissions, occurrences and transactions alleged herein.

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PLAINTIFFS' FACTS

14. On or about June of 2006, Plaintiffs purchased 2006 Kia Sedona from a car dealership under a conditional sales contract. The dealership arranged the financing for the purchase, and assigned the conditional sales contract to Fireside Bank. The conditional sale contract (a "Form Agreement") is regulated by the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act, and provided that the holder of the contract is subject to all claims and defense which the consumer could assert against the seller.

- 15. From July 2006, through May 2012, Plaintiffs made regular and timely payments to Fireside Bank, with the expectation that their last and final payment of approximately \$628.83 due on their conditional sales contract would be made in June 2012.
- 16. However, in or around May of 2012, Fireside Bank sold Plaintiffs' conditional sales contract to Defendant Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC. In the same month, Cavalry demanded approximately \$5,000 from Plaintiffs to allegedly payoff their vehicle under the terms of their conditional sales contract. Plaintiffs disputed the \$5,000 amount, telling the Cavalry agent that they only owed an additional \$628.83.
- 17. In November 2012, Cavalry repossessed Plaintiffs' vehicle, and mailed a written notice to them on November 14, 2012, which stated that their vehicle had been repossessed and would be sold and assessed a \$675.00 repossession fee ("Statutory Notice"). However, the Statutory Notice did not contain several of the disclosures mandated by Civil Code §2983.2.
- 18. The Statutory Notice issued by Cavalry to Plaintiffs was mandated by the provisions of the Rees-Levering Act, including Civil Code § 2983.2(a). The Rees-Levering Act, among other provisions, regulates the repossession and disposition of motor vehicles financed under conditional sales contracts in California. In order to protect consumers' valuable property interest in financed

vehicles, the Rees-Levering Act imposes strict and mandatory requirements on holders of conditional sales contracts following repossession.

- 19. California Civil Code § 2983.2(a) of the Rees-Levering Act mandates the issuance of a post-repossession Statutory Notice, and sub-section (a)(1) through (a)(9) of the statute set forth the required information and disclosures that must be included therein.
- 20. Absent full, complete, and strict compliance with the requirements for the Statutory Notice, a holder may not lawfully assess of collect any deficiency from the buyer, or any other person liable under the contract, following disposition of the repossessed vehicle. The statute specifically provides that those persons "shall be liable for any deficiency... only if the notice prescribed by" § 2983,2(a) contains all of the disclosures mandated by the statute. (Emphasis added.)
- 21. The Rees-Levering Act further provides that no seller or holder may obtain a deficiency judgment against a buyer under a conditional sales contract after the repossession and disposition of a motor vehicle unless a court has determined, upon the affidavit of the seller or holder, that the sale or other disposition was in conformity with the provisions of the Rees-Levering Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 2983.8.
- 22. The Statutory Notice that Cavalry issued to Plaintiffs pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2, following the repossession of their vehicle was materially defective and incomplete, and failed to inform Plaintiffs of all their legal rights and obligations, in that the Statutory Notice did not contain disclosures required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983(a), and assessed a repossession fee of \$675.00 in order to redeem their vehicle, which is in excess of the amount allowed for under the law. See Cal. Fin. Code §§ 22328, 22329, and 22202(f).
- 23. Specifically, the Statutory Notice fails to disclose to consumers all of the conditions precedent to reinstatement of the contact, as required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983,2(a)(2), in that the Statutory Notice fails to provide consumer

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sufficient information to enable them to determine precisely what they must do in order to reinstate their contracts, including stating the amounts due, to whom they are due, the addresses and/or contact information for those parties, and any other specific actions the buyer must take; instead, the Statutory Notices fails to disclose to the consumer whether a fee to the sheriff pursuant to Government Code §26751 before the vehicle is return, and requires that consumers "[c]all us at the telephone number at the top of this notice to find out the exact amount due...." See Statutory Notice, pg. 3; see also Juarez v. Arcadia Financial, Ltd., 152 Cal.App.4th 889 (2007).

- that the consumer has the right to reinstate the conditional sales contract, as required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a)(2), and instead states on the one hand that the consumer has the right to redeem or reinstate, but states on the other hand that the consumer has the right to "get the Vehicle back at any time before we sell it by paying us the full amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our expenses." The Statutory Notice also fails to disclose clearly and unequivocally that Cavalry will extend the time to reinstate on the consumer's request, as required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a)(6), and instead in one portion states only "[y]ou have a right to request an extension of this time...," and on another portion states "we will extend the time to reinstate the contract, if you have that right, or to redeem. The Statutory Notice also fails to provide, in the form applying for an extension of time, an address to send the request, and instructions that it must be received before the expiration of the initial redemption and reinstatement periods, as required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a)(3).
- 25. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the defective and improper Statutory Notice issued to them was a standard form notice sent by Cavalry, at least four years preceding the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter, as a common practice and procedure to numerous other California

buyers liable to Cavalry under conditional sales contracts and whose vehicles were repossessed.

- 26. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that, following the issuance of the Statutory Notice, Defendant Cavalry sold or otherwise disposed of Plaintiffs' vehicle on or about November 29, 2012.
- 27. After disposing of Plaintiffs' vehicle, Cavalry assessed and attempted to collect from Plaintiffs an alleged deficiency balance.
- 28. As a result of Defendant Cavalry's unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, Plaintiffs have suffered a loss of money and/or property.
- 29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that, notwithstanding Calvary's failure to comply with the mandatory Statutory Notice requirements of the Rees-Levering Act, Cavalry has assessed, demanded, attempted to collect, and collected deficiency balances from borrowers, including from Plaintiffs, for which the borrowers were not liable as a matter of law and which Cavalry has no legal right to demand or collect. In the four years preceding the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter, Cavalry has made unlawful collection demands to Plaintiffs, and to other California borrowers, has falsely represented to such borrowers that deficiency balances were owed, has collected thousands of dollars from such borrowers to which they were not entitled, and has threatened to sue, and has sued, borrowers who did not owe any deficiency as a matter of law.
- 30. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that, at all relevant times, Cavalry has had actual and/or constructive knowledge that such borrowers were not liable for any deficiency balance as a matter of law as a result of their failure to comply with the Rees-Levering Act, but has nevertheless persisted in its unlawful collection activity.
- 31. The conditional sales contract under which Plaintiffs purchased their vehicle was a pre-printed, standard form agreement that is routinely used by

dealers in California, including those contracts that have been assigned to Cavalry. Aside from financing terms that are individual to each borrower, all such standard form agreements contain certain provisions that are the same or substantially similar for all borrowers under conditional sales contracts in California. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that each such conditional sales contract contains a provision that providers that the holder of the contract, here Cavalry, is liable for all claims and defenses that the borrower may have against the seller of the motor vehicle.

- 32. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that, in the four years preceding the filing of this action and continuing thereafter, Defendant Cavalry was assigned and thereafter held conditional sales contracts with California borrowers, issued Statutory Notices to California borrowers that did not comply with the Rees-Levering Act as aforesaid, and has attempted to collect and has collected purported deficiency balances from California borrowers which were not owed to Defendant Calvary as a matter of law.
- 33. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that, in the four years preceding the filing of this action and continuing thereafter, Defendant Cavalry has regularly and consistently breached the terms of its standard form agreements with California borrowers, including with Plaintiffs, by failing and/or refusing to provide borrowers notice as required by law following the repossession of their motor vehicles, and by thereafter assessing, demanding and attempting to collect alleged deficiency balances that the borrowers did not owe as a matter of law.
- 34. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that the total deficiency balances collected by Cavalry and which were not owed as a matter of law exceed \$5,000,000.

#### CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

- 35. Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
- 36. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent (the "Class") is defined as follows.

All persons who were issued a Statutory Notice by Cavalry, to an address in California, at any time from the four years preceding the filing of this action, following the repossession or voluntary surrender of a motor vehicle, and from whom Cavalry collected, or attempted to collect any portion of the deficiency balance ("Class").

- 37. Members of the Class will be referred to as "Class Members." Plaintiffs reserve the right to redefine the above Class and add additional subclasses as appropriate based on investigation, discovery, and the specific theories of liability.
- 38. Excluded from the Class are Welch's, its affiliates, employees, agents, and attorneys, and the Court.
- 39. This action is brought and properly may be maintained as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1)-(4) and 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3) and satisfies the requirements thereof.
- 40. There is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the class is readily ascertainable:
  - (a) Numerosity: Upon information and belief, the members of the class (and each subclass) are so numerous that joinder of all members would be unfeasible and impractical. The membership of the entire class is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time; however, the class is estimated to be greater than one hundred (100) individuals and the identity of such membership is readily ascertainable by inspection of

Defendant's records.

- (b) <u>Typicality</u>: Plaintiffs are qualified to, and will, fairly and adequately protect the interests of each class member with whom they have a well defined community of interest, and Plaintiffs' claims (or defenses, if any) are typical of all Class Members' as demonstrated herein.
- (c) Adequacy: Plaintiffs are qualified to, and will, fairly and adequately, protect the interests of each class member with whom they have a well-defined community of interest and typicality of claims, as demonstrated herein. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have an obligation to make known to the Court any relationship, conflicts or differences with any Class Member. Plaintiffs' attorneys, the proposed class counsel, are versed in the rules governing class action discovery, certification and settlement. Plaintiffs have incurred, and throughout the duration of this action, will continue to incur costs and attorneys' fees that have been, are and will be necessarily expended for the prosecution of this action for the substantial benefit of each Class Member.
- (d) <u>Superiority</u>: The nature of this action makes the use of class action adjudication superior to other methods. A class action will achieve economies of time, effort and expense as compared with separate lawsuits, and will avoid inconsistent outcomes because the same issues can be adjudicated in the same manner and at the same time for the entire class.
- 41. There are common questions of law and fact as to the class members that predominate over questions affecting only individual members, including but not limited to:

- (a) Whether Defendants failed to provide Statutory Notices to individuals whose motor vehicles were repossessed containing all disclosures required by the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act;
- (b) Whether Defendant assessed, attempted to collect and/or collected deficiency balances from Class Members that it had no legal right to demand or to collect;
- (c) Whether Defendant demanded repossession expenses which exceeds the amount allowable under California; and
- (d) The appropriate amount of statutory damages, attorneys' fees and costs resulting from Defendants' violations of California law.
- 42. In the alternative, this action is certifiable under the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and/or 23(b)(2) because:
  - (e) The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class
    Members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying
    adjudications with respect to individual Class Members which
    would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
    Defendant.
  - (f) The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class
    Members would create a risk of adjudications as to them
    which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the
    interests of the other Class Members not parties to the
    adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability
    to protect their interests; and
  - (g) Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with

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respect to the Class and necessitating that any such relief be extended to Class Members on a mandatory, class-wide basis.

- 43. Plaintiffs are not aware of any difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which should preclude class certification.
- 44. Among other things, each Class Members' interest in individually controlling the prosecution of the claims herein makes it virtually impossible to assert those claims outside the class action context.
- 45. Moreover, the class definition is ascertainable and lends itself to class certification because Defendant's Statutory Notice is the same for all Class Members in that it fails to comply with Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act.

### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

# Violation of Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Cal. Civil Code §§ 2981 et seq.)

- 46. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above.
- 47. As is hereinabove alleged, the Rees-Levering Automobiles Sales Finance Act, Civil Code §2981, et seq., regulates automobile sales and financing transactions for motor vehicles purchased primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
- 48. The contracts with Cavalry entered into by Plaintiffs and Class Members are subject to and governed by the provisions Rees-Levering Act, because Defendant Cavalry is a "seller"; or a "holder" of said contracts as those terms are used in the statute.
- 49. As is hereinabove alleged, Defendant Cavalry has engaged in violations of the Rees-Levering Act in that the Statutory Notices it issued to Plaintiffs and all other persons similarly situated following the repossession of a motor vehicle, did not contain all of the statutorily-mandated disclosures and information required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a) and assessed a repossession

fee in excess of what is allowed under Cal. Fin. Code § 22202(f).

- 50. Cavalry has thus deprived Plaintiffs and Class Members of substantial rights granted to them under the Rees-Levering Act, including the right to make an informed decision about whether to reinstate their contract or redeem their vehicle. In addition, because Cavalry failed to provide Class Members all of the information and disclosures to which they are entitled under Civil Code §2983.2(a), said persons are not liable, under the explicit terms of §§2983.2(a) of the Rees-Levering Act, for any deficiency following the disposition of their repossessed motor vehicles. Nevertheless, without any legal right to do so, Cavalry has assessed, attempted to collect and collected deficiency balances from Plaintiffs and Class Members in direct violation of the law.
- 51. As a direct and proximate result of the acts hereinabove alleged, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been or will be damaged, and have suffered economic losses, in an amount to be proven at trial, in that Defendant Cavalry, without any legal right to do so, has assessed, attempted to collect, collected and/or will collect substantial deficiency balances from said persons, for which they are not liable as a matter of law.
- 52. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of this action, pursuant to Civil Code §2983 and Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.
  - 53. Wherefore, Plaintiffs prays for relief as set forth below.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.)

- 54. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above.
- 55. California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice."
  - 56. Defendant's Cavalry's actions, as set forth herein, constitutes an

"unlawful" business act or practice within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq., because Cavalry has pursued unlawful collection deficiency balances despite having actual and/or constructive knowledge that affected borrowers are not liable for such deficiency balances as a result of the failure to comply with relevant provisions of the Rees-Levering Act and California Finance Code.

- 57. As is hereinabove alleged, in the four years preceding the filing of this action, and continuing for all relevant times thereafter, Cavalry has repossessed motor vehicles from borrowers, including Plaintiffs, and thereafter issued Statutory Notices pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a) of the Rees-Levering Act that were materially defective in that they did not contain the disclosures required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a) and assessed a repossession fee in excess of what is allowed under the law, and which Cavalry had no legal right to demand or collect.
- have issued payment demands to affected borrowers, have threatened to sue and/or sued such borrowers and have negligently and/or fraudulently misrepresented to such borrowers that they are liable for a deficiency balance, when in fact no such liability exists. Cavalry has also sought and obtained deficiency judgments against borrowers that it was not legally entitled to obtain.
- 59. Defendant's Cavalry's actions, as set forth herein, constitutes an "unfair" business act or practice within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq., because any utility for Defendant's Cavalry's conduct is outweighed by the gravity of the consequences to Plaintiffs and Class Members and because the conduct offends public policy.
- 60. Notwithstanding the failure to include all disclosures mandated by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a) in the Statutory Notices issued to affected borrowers, Cavalry, had assessed, demanded, attempted to collect and collected deficiency

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27 28 balances from such borrowers for which the borrowers were not liable as a matter of law and assessed a repossession fee in excess of what is allowed under the law, and which Cavalry had no legal right to demand or collect.

- In addition, Defendant's Cavalry's actions constitute a "fraudulent" 61. business practice or act within the meaning of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. The Rees-Levering Financial Act is carefully crafted to require that certain disclosures be presented in a qualified and contextualized manner to protect the consuming public from being deceived. Defendant's conduct poses the very risk of deception the regulations were promulgated to protect against.
- As a direct and proximate result of the Calvary's acts and practices 62. described herein, Cavalry has received and collected substantial monies from affected borrowers in the form of deficiency balances that it demanded and collected, even though such borrowers were no liable for the deficiencies as a matter of law and/or paid repossession fees in excess of what is allowable under the law. Cavalry has collected and retained such funds, to which it is not and never was legally entitled, and has profited unlawfully and unfairly thereby. Such funds properly belong to the affected borrowers and constitute ill-gotten gains subject to restitution. As a result of Cavalry's unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, the affected borrowers, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property.
- Defendant's Cavalry has thus engaged in unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business acts entitling Plaintiffs and Class Members to judgment and equitable relief against Defendant's Cavalry, as set forth below. Additionally, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203, Plaintiffs and Class Members seek an order requiring Defendant's Cavalry's to immediately cease such acts of unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices and requiring Defendant's Cavalry to correct its actions.

64. Wherefore, Plaintiffs prays for relief as set forth below.

#### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

# Violation of Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Cal. Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq.)

- 65. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above.
- collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692J, inclusive of, and shall be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k of, Title 15 of the United States Code statutory regulations contained within the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, and § 1692d(5).
- 67. On information and belief, Defendant demanded an amount from affected borrowers, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, for repossession expenses which exceed the amount allowable under California law.
- 68. Defendant's conduct violated the RFDCPA in multiple ways, including but not limited to:
  - (a) Making a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the debt collection (§ 1692e);
  - (b) Making a false, or misleading representation regarding the character, amount, or legal status of the alleged debt (§ 1692e(2);
- 69. As a direct and proximate result of the acts hereinabove alleged, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been, continue to be, or will be damaged, and have suffered personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and emotional distress, and Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for their actual damages, statutory damages, and costs and attorney's fees.
  - 70. Wherefore, Plaintiffs prays for relief as set forth below.

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### FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Conversion

- 71. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above.
- 72. Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to advise Plaintiffs and Class Members of the amount that must be paid or any other act that must be done to reinstate the loan as required by Civil Code Sections 2983.2 and 2983.3. Moreover, Defendant has attempted to charge Plaintiffs and Class Members more than the amount allowable by law for a repossession expense.
- 73. As a proximate result of Defendant's actions, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been deprived of their vehicles, incurred expenses for alternate transportation, incurred unnecessary storage charges for their vehicles, and have lost time and effort in attempting to reinstate their Vehicle loans with Defendant.
- 74. Plaintiffs and Class Members were entitled to immediate possession of their vehicles by paying the proper redemption or reinstatement amount to Cavalry, which Defendant never properly disclosed or identified in its Statutory Notices to affected borrowers, pursuant to their rights under the Rees-Levering Act.
- 75. Plaintiffs and Class Members also were entitled to immediate possession of monies paid to Cavalry on their deficiency balances to which Cavalry had no right or entitlement to assess, demand, attempt to collect and/or collected.
- 76. As a direct and proximate result of the acts hereinabove alleged, Cavalry wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs and Class Members of possession of their vehicles by failing to properly disclose their right to redeem/reinstate their conditional sales contracts in the language required by Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a). This omission violated Cal. Civil Code § 2983.2(a), and unlawfully inhibited Plaintiffs' and Class Members' right to reinstate and/or redeem their

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conditional sales contracts.

- 77. As a direct and proximate result of the acts hereinabove alleged, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been or will be damaged, and have suffered economic losses, in an amount to be proven at trial, for Defendant Cavalry's unlawful conversion of their property.
- 78. Cavalry acted with malice, oppression, and/or fraud toward Plaintiffs and Class Members, within the meaning of Cal. Civil Code § 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and Class Members to an award of punitive damages.
- 79. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of this action, pursuant to Civil Code §2983 and Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.
  - 80. Wherefore, Plaintiffs prays for relief as set forth below.

#### FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Declaratory Relief

- 81. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above.
- Members, on the one hand, and Defendant Cavalry and Does I though 10, on the other hand as to their respective rights, remedies and obligations. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the acts and practices of Cavalry, as hereinabove alleged, violate the Rees-Levering Act, and Cavalry's acts and practices as hereinabove alleged are unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent, and that Plaintiffs and Class Members are therefore not liable, and never were liable, for any deficiency balances following disposition of their repossessed motor vehicles. Defendant Cavalry contends to the contrary.
- 83. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a declaration as to the respective rights, remedies, and obligations of the Parties.
  - 84. Wherefore, Plaintiffs prays for relief as set forth below.

### REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs request a trial by jury of all issues which may be tried by a jury pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs, and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, prays for relief and judgment against Defendant, jointly and severally, as follows:

- 1. That this case be certified as a class action;
- 2. That Plaintiffs be appointed as the representative of the Class; and
- 3. That counsel for Plaintiffs be appointed as Class Counsel;
- 4. For an order finding and declaring that Defendant Cavalry's acts and practices as challenged herein are unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent;
- 5. For an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant Cavalry from engaging in the practices challenged herein;
- 6. For an order of restitution in an amount to be determined at trial to restore all affected borrowers in interest, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, all monies acquired by Defendant Cavalry by means of their unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent practices, which amount is at least equal to all sums collected for alleged deficiency balances following the disposition of repossessed motor vehicles.
- 7. For statutory damages of \$1,000 to Plaintiffs and each Class Members;
- 8. For actual and compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by the Court;
- 9. For, attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to California Civil Code § 2983.4, Code of Civil Procedures § 1021.5, and any other applicable provisions of law; and
  - 10. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem equitable

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1	and appropriate.	
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3	D 46.11	ed,
4	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	L. PAUL MANKIN, IV
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6	By:	TY Pag
7	L. Paul Mankin,	
8	8 Michael Castillo	aintiffs Yvette and
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28	28 Page 20	
	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT	

٨	UNITEDST	ATES DISTRICT CO		COVER SHEET		, (,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS ( Chec	k box if you are repre	senting yourself ( )	DEFENDANTS (Check box if you are representing yourself [ ])					
YVETTE CASTILLO and MICHA members of the general publ	EL CASTILLO, Individual		CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10					
(b) Attorneys (Firm Name, are representing yourself, L. Paul Mankin, IV LAW OFFICES OF L. PAUL MA 8730 Wilshire Blod, Suite 310 Beverly Hills, California 90211	kKin' in btonide same iutotwa	tion.j		(b) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number, If you are representing yourself, provide same information.)				
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in one box only.)  III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES-For Diversity Cases Only (Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant)								
☐ 1. U.S. Government Plaintiff	Citizen	of This State  PTF DEF of Business In this State						
2, U,S, Government Defendant	4. Diversity (I of Parties in I	ndicate Citizenship tem III)		or Subject of a n Country	3·	of Business in Ar	6 6	
IV. ORIGIN (Place an X I	n one box only.)						Multi-	
	Removed from	3, Remanded from Appellate Court		opened L F	District	(5pedfy)	District tigation	
V. REQUESTED IN COM	APLAINT: JURY DE	MAND: 🔀 Yes 🛭	] No	(Check "Yes" o	only i	if demanded in comp	olalnt.)	
CLASS ACTION under	F.R.Cv.P. 23: 🔀	′es □No	[	MONEY DEM	AND	ED IN COMPLAINT:	\$ 5,000,000	
THE STATE OF A STICK	(Cite the U.S. Civil Statut	Act (Call Civil Code 66.79	HI PTS	eo.it (zi violation oi u	mone	Townshing the contractions	tional statutes unless diversity.) Iness & Professions Code §§ 17200	
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (	Place an X in one bo	x only).						
OTHER STATUTES	CONTRACT	REAL PROPERTY CON	۲.	IMMIGRATION	1	PRISONER PETITIONS	PROPERTY RIGHTS	
375 False Claims Act	110 Insurance	240 Torts to Land		462 Naturalization Application		Habeas Corpus:	820 Copyrights	
400 State Reapportionment	☐ 120 Marine	245 Tort Product Liability		465 Other	님	463 Allen Detainee 510 Motions to Vacate	830 Patent	
410 Antitrust	☐ 130 Miller Act	290 All Other Real Property		Immigration Actions TORTS	5	Sentence 530 General	840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY	
430 Banks and Banking	140 Negotlable Instrument	TORTS	PE	RSONAL PROPERTY		535 Death Penalty	861 HIA (1395ff)	
☐ 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/Etc,	150 Recovery of Overpayment &	PERSONAL PROPERT  310 Airplane	<u>'</u>	370 Other Fraud		Other:	862 Black Lung (923)	
460 Deportation	Enforcement of	315 Airplane		371 Truth in Lending	a 🗀	540 Mandamus/Other	863 DIWC/DIWW (405 (g))	
470 Racketeer Influ-	Judgment  151 Medicare Act	Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel 8		380 Other Personal Property Damage		550 Civil Rights	864 SSID Title XVI	
enced & Corrupt Org,  480 Consumer Credit	152 Recovery of	□ Slander		385 Property Damag	ge	555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee	☐ 865 RSI (405 (g))	
480 Consumer Credit 490 Cable/Sat TV	Defaulted Student Loan (Excl. Vet.)	330 Fed, Employer:		Product Liability BANKRUPTCY	$\dashv \Box$	Conditions of Confinement	FEDERAL TAX SUITS	
850 Securities/Com-	153 Recovery of	340 Marine				ORFEITURE/PENALTY	B70 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)	
☐ modities/Exchange	Overpayment of	☐ 345 Marine Produc Liability		422 Appeal 28 USC 158		625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21	871 IRS-Third Party 26 USC	
■ 890 Other Statutory     Actions	Vet. Benefits  160 Stockholders'	350 Motor Vehicle		423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157		USC 881	1005	
☐ 891 Agricultural Acts	Sults	355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability		CIVIL RIGHTS /		690 Other		
☐ 893 Environmental Matters	190 Other Contract	360 Other Personal		440 Other Civil Righ	its	LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards		
B95 Freedom of Info.	195 Contract	injury  362 Personal injury  Med Malpratice	, 📙	441 Voting 442 Employment		Act		
☐ Act ☐ 896 Arbitration	Product Liability	Med Malpratice 365 Personal Injury		443 Housing/		720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations		
	196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY	Product Liability		Accomodations 445 American with		740 Rallway Labor Act		
899 Admin, Procedures Act/Review of Appeal of Agency Decision		367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal injury Product Liability		Disabilities- Employment 446 American with		751 Family and Medical Leave Act 790 Other Labor		
950 Constitutionality of State Statutes	230 Rent Lease & Ejectment	368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability		Disabilities-Other 448 Education		Litigation 791 Employee Ret. Inc. Security Act		
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY: Case Number: CV13-8234								



CV-71 (09/13)

#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

VIII. VENUE: Your answers to the questions below will determine the division of the Court to which this case will most likely be initially assigned. This initial assignment is subject to change, in accordance with the Court's General Orders, upon review by the Court of your Complaint or Notice of Removal,

Question A: Was this case removed from		STATEGASEWASIR	NDINGIN	THECOL	UNITYOER,	UND	TALIDIVISIONIINICA	(CDIS)	
state court?	☐ Los Angeles					Western			
Yes X No							Western		
If "no, " go to Question B, If "yes," check the box to the right that applies, enter the		Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo					Southern		
corresponding division in response to Question D, below, and skip to Section IX.	<u> </u>	)range				Eastern			
	☐ R	iverside or San Bernardino				<del></del>			
Question B: Is the United States, or one its agencies or employees, a party to this	of	f   If the United States, or one of its agencies or employees, is a party, is					ITINI	AI.	
action?		A PLAINTIFF?		A DEFENDANT?			DIVISION IN		
☐ Yes ⊠ No						CACD IS: ow for the county in PLAINTIFFS reside,			
If "no, " go to Question C. If "yes," check the	☐ r	os Angeles			s Angeles	Western			
box to the right that applies, enter the corresponding division in response to		Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo			Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo		Western		
Question D, below, and skip to Section IX.		)range		Or	ange		Southern		
	☐ R	Riverside or San Bernardino			Riverside or San Bernardino		Eastern		
		Other	Other			Western			
	A,	Т В.	C.		D,	Τ	E,	F,	
Question C: Location of piaintiffs, defendants, and claims?	Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo Counties	Orange	County	Riverside or San Bernardino Countles	Outside the Central District of California		Other		
Indicate the location in which a majority of plaintiffs reside:		X		]					
Indicate the location in which a majority of defendants reside;							X		
Indicate the location in which a majority of claims arose:				)				$\boxtimes$	
majority of Clarity arosa.									
C(1. Is either of the following true? If so,	check th	ne one that applies:	C,2, Is	either o	f the following true? If so	o, check the	one that applies:		
2 or more answers in Column C			2 or more answers in Column D						
only I answer in Column C and n	only 1 answer in Column D and no answers in Column C								
Your case will initially be assigned to the Your case will initially be assigned to the									
SOUTHERN DIVISION. Enter "Southern" in response to Question D, below.				EASTERN DIVISION. Enter "Eastern" in response to Question D, below.					
If none applies, answer question C2 to the right				If none applies, go to the box below,					
		Your case Will I	nitially be TERN DIVIS		I to the				
		Enter "Western" in r			on D below,				
Question D; Initial Division? INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD									
Enter the initial division determined by Question A, B, or C above:				Western Division					
CV-71 (09/13)		CIVII	COVER S	HEET			Pa	ge 2 of 3	

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

•		CIVIL COVER SHEET					
IX(a), IDENTICAL CAS	ES: Has this act	ion been previously filed in this court and dismissed, remanded or closed?	⋈	☐ YES			
If yes, ilst case numb	er(s):						
IX(b). RELATED CASES	St. Have any case	es been previously filed in this court that are related to the present case?	⊠ NO	☐ YES			
If yes, list case numb	er(s);			<del></del>			
Civil cases are deemed r	elated if a previo	usly filed case and the present case:					
(Check all boxes that appl	y) 🔲 A. Arise f	rom the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or					
,	B. Call for	r determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fa	ict; or				
	C. For oti	her reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different Judges;	or				
	D. Involv	e the same patent, trademark or copyright <u>, and</u> one of the factors identified above ir	a, b or c also Is pro	esent,			
X. SIGNATURE OF AT (OR SELF-REPRESENT		: DAT	E 11/4/	10			
		Civil Cover Sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplem proved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is require rpose of statistics, venue and initiating the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed inst					
Key to Statistical codes relati	ing to Social Secur	ity Cases:					
Nature of Sult Code	Abbreviation	Substantive Statement of Cause of Action All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Soc	vial Sacurity Act ac	amended Also			
861	HIA	All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under that 16, Fat 18, of the 300 include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as provid (42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b))	ers of services und	er the program.			
862	923)						
All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U,S,C, 405 (g))							
863	All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C., 405 (g))						
864	All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security Act, a amended.						
865	RSI	All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social (42 U.S.C. 405 (g))	Security Act, as an	nended.			
·							

CIVIL COVER SHEET Page 3 of 3

CV-71 (09/13)

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

#### NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES JUDGES

This case has been	assigned to District Judge	Fernando M.	Olguin	and the assigned
Magistrate Judge is	Alka Sagar	_··		
The case:	number on all documents filed	with the Court shou	ıld read as follov	vs:
	2:13CV8234	FMO ASx		
	al Order 05-07 of the United St Judge has been designated to h			District of
All discovery relate	ed motions should be noticed o	n the calendar of the	e Magistrate Jud	ge.
		Clerk, U. S. D	istrict Court	
November 6, 201	3	By J.Prado		
Date		Deputy Cl	erk	
	NOTICE TO	COUNSEL		
	be served with the summons and nust be served on all plaintiffs).	l complaint on all de	fendants (if a re	moval action is
Subsequent documents m	nust be filed at the following lo	ocation:		
Western Division 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 900		St., Ste 1053	Eastern Divisio 3470 Twelfth St Riverside, CA 9	treet, Room 134
Failure to file at the prop	er location will result in your	documents being re	eturned to you.	
CV-18 (08/13)	NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO U	NITED STATES JUDGES		